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654 ASH V. MORTENSEN [24 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18842. In Bank. Aur,. 11, 1944.] 
EDITH M. ASH, Appellant, v. W. S. MORTENSEN et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Damagcs-Measure-Personal Injuries-Aggravation by Neg-
ligence of Doctor.-Where one who has suffered personal 
injuries by the tortious act of another exercises due care 
in securing the services of a doctor and his injuries are 
aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the law regards 
the act of the original wrongdoer as a proximate cause of 
the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent medical 
treatment and holds him liable therefor. 
[2] Torts-Joint and Several Liability-Independent and Succes-
sive Acts.-Where injuries inflicted on a woman by a negli~ 
gent motorist were aggravated by the alleged negligence of 
doctors who treated such injuries, the independent· and suc-
cessive acts of the motorist and the doctors, differing in time 
and place of commission as well as in nature, produced two 
separate injuries and gave rise to two distinct causes of 
action. The injured woman was at liberty to sue the motorist 
for damages resulting from the original injury alone, and 
to sue the doctors for damages resulting from the additional 
injury or aggravation, in separate actions; and the order in 
which such actions might be brought would be immaterial. 
[3] Release-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers.-The 
rule adopted in a number of jurisdictions that the release of 
the original wrongdoer releases the attending doctor from lia-
bility for malpractice is not applicable in California, as such 
rule has been reached by treating the independent wrongdoers 
[1] Liability of one causing personal injuries for consequences 
of negligence, mistake or lack of skill of physician or surgeon, 
notes, 8 A.L.R. 506; 39 A.L.R. 1268; 126 A.L.R. 912. See, also, 
15 Am.Jur. 495. 
[3] Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability 
of physician or surg-eon for negligent treatment of injury, notes, 
50 A.L.R. 1108; 112 A.L.R. 553. See, also, 22 Cal.Jur. 762; 41 
Am.Jur. 252; 45 Am.Jur. 703. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Damages, § 66; [2] Torts, § 6; 
[3, [i-8] Release, § 16(3); (4] Release, § 16(4); [9J Automobiles, 
§ 361(1). 
" '1 .::J I ... \::) U~ 
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as joint tort feasors, or applying, by analogy, the common-
law rule of unity of discharge affecting joint tort fl'asors. 
[4] Id.-Persons Released-Joint Tort Feasors.-The <,ommon-Iaw 
rule of unity of discharge affecting joint tort feasors is hased 
on the concept of the unity of a cause of action against such 
wrongdoers. 
[5] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers.-A rel!'ase 
of a cause of action against a wrongdoer is not a release of 
a separate or distinct cause of action against another inde-
pendent wrongdoer. 
[6] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers.-A release 
of one originally responsible for an injury should release an 
attending doctor from liability for aggravation of the injury 
if there has been full compensation for both injuries, but not 
otherwise. . 
[7] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers-Full Com-
pensation. - A woman who sued a motorist for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile action did not receive full compensa-
tion for both such injuries and those aggravated by the alleg'ed 
negligence of the doctors who attended her, where she relleivert 
only slightly more than one-third of the amount of the judt;-
ment against the motorist, and she was entitled, in a separnte 
malpractice action, to recover from the doctors for actual dam-
ages suffered by reason of their tortious acts, if any, for which 
she had received no compensation. 
[8] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers-Presump-
tions.-While a payment in consideration of the release of 
one of several joint or independent concurrent tort feasors 
may be presumed to have been made and accepted as full 
compensation or satisfaction for the alleged injury, such 
presumption should not be indulged where the injured per-
son's claim embraces separate injuries caused by independent 
successive tort feasors and is liquidated by a judgment against 
the original tort feasor. The presumption of full compensa-
tion or satisfaction must be based on the fact that there is 
but a single indivisible injury and that the claim arising 
therefrom is unliquidated. 
[9] Automobiles-Judgments-Conclusiveness.-A judgment in a 
personal injury action against a negligent motorist is not, in 8 
malpractice action against the dodors who treated plain-
tiff for the injuries sustained, binding on the doctors or res 
judicata as to them, and they have the right to show what 
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damage, if any, was actually suffered by reason of malprac-
tice and to have the award in the malpractice action restricted 
to the difference between such damage and any sum alread$ 
received by plaintiff as compensation therefor. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Benjamin J. Scheinman, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for malpractice. Judgments for defendants re-
versed. 
.Anne 0 'Keefe and Ralph C. Curren for Appellant. 
Chase, Barnes & Chase, Wm. M. Rains and James W. 
Brown for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff was injured in an automobile 
accident and received medical and surgical treatment neces-
sitated thereby. In 1940 she sued Robert Wubben, the negli-
gent motorist, and recovered judgment in the sum of $15,000. 
Upon payment by Wubben of $5,753.22 the judgment was 
satisfied Ot record and plaintiff signed a document releasing 
him from further liability. 
In August, 1941, plaintiff brought the present malpractice 
action against W. S. Mortensen and W. L. Mortensen, th~ 
doctors who treated her injuries. Among other things, it waS 
alleged that defendants negligently treated a fracture of the 
femur bones by failing to secure them in position, and that, 
notwithstanding the fact that an X-ray picture showed the 
bones were out of position, defendants failed to reset them 
and knowingly permitted them to heal in improper alignment, 
as a result of which plaintiff's legs were shortened and bowed 
and their use practically lost to her for life. 
In their answers defendants set up the affirmative defense 
that the judgment, satisfaction of record and release in the 
first action against Wubben operated to discharge any liability 
on their part. The issues thus tendered by the answers were 
separately tried, and the court concluded that the facts pleaded 
constituted a complete defense to this action. Accordingly, 
judgment was entered in favor of each defendant, with costs, 
and this appeal followed. . 
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Plaintiff urges that under general principles of tort law 
the release of Wubben in consideration of part payment of the 
judgment against him does not bar this malpractice action 
against defendants who allegedly were negligent in treating 
the injuries inflicted by Wubben. Defendants, on the other 
hand, contend that since a person should not be twice com-
pensated for the same injury and since plaintiff could have 
recovered compensation for damages resulting from the alleged 
malpractice in the action against Wubben, the release of 
Wubben and" the satisfaction of the judgment in that action 
are a complete defense to this action . 
[1] It is settled that where one who has suffered personai 
injuries by reason of the tortious act of another exercises due 
care in securing the services of a doctor and his injuries are 
aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the law regards 
the act of the original wrongdoer as a proximate cause of 
the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent medical 
treatment and holds him liable therefor. (Dewhwst v. Leo-
pold, 194 Cal. 424, 433 [229 P. 30] ; Rest., Torts, § 457; Mc-
Cormick, Damages, p. 272; note, 39 A.L.R. 1268.) [2] But 
the fact that plaintiff could have obtained full compensation 
for all damages in the action against Wubben, the original 
wrongdoer, does not establish that she has been so compen-
sated. The independent and successive acts of Wubben and 
defendant doctors, differing in time and place of commission 
as well as in nature, produced two separate injuries and gave 
rise to two distinct causes of action. Plaintiff was at liberty 
to sue Wubben for damages resulting from the original injury 
alone, and to sue defendants for damages resUlting from the 
additional injury or aggravation, in separate actions ; and the 
order in which such actions might be brought would be imma-
terial. (See Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. 217 [256 S.W. 
239,243, 29 A.L.R. 1305] ; Rest., Torts, § 879, Illus. 3.) The 
plea of former recovery, therefore, involves a consideration of 
what the injured party did in fact recover in her action 
again~he original wrongdoer rather than what she could 
have recovered therein. (Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150 [106. 
A. 602]; Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. 217, supra; Staehlm 
v. Hochdoerfer, (Mo.), 235 S.W. 1060; cf. Smith v. Coleman, 
46 Cal.App.2d 507 [116 P.2d 133]; Viita v. Dolan (Viita V. 
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Fleming), 132 Minn. 128 l155 ~. W. 1077, 1080, Anu. Cas. 
1917E 678, L.R.A. 191pD 644].) 
[3] Defendants insist, however, that without regard to the 
evidence introduced in the action against Wubben, and thm: 
without regard to the nature and extent of the recover:' t]If'l't·ill. 
the release of Wubben from all liability operated to diselllll·g t • 
them from liability for any negligent aggravation of tilp oJ" 
inal injury. In their view, the amount of damages susta ilH'ti 
plaintiff, the sum received as consideration for the release, .(" 
the relation between the two, the intention of the partIe.::;, all 
the fact that Wubben and defendant doctors are illllependeli l 
rather than joint wrongdoers, are immaterial. In other worch 
defendants seek to substitute a rule of law for the factual dp 
fense of double recovery. The rule contended for has be(,l: 
adopted in a number of jurisdictions. (Feinstone v. AlliSON 
Hospital, 106 Fla. 302 [143 So. 251]; Paris v. Crittenden. 
142 Kan. 296 [46 P.2d 633] ; Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 48!) 
[239 N.W. 223] ; Adams v. DeYoe, 11 N.J.Misc. 319 [166 A. 
485] ; Milks v. Mchror, 264 N.Y. 267 [190 N.E. 487] ; Tanner: 
v. Espey, 128 Ohio 82 [190 N.E. 229] ; Thompson v. Fox; 326 
Pa. 209 [192 A. 107, 112 A.L.R. 550] ; Martin v. Cunningham, 
93 Wash. 517 [161 P. 355]; Mier v. Yoho, 114 W.Va. 248 [171 
S.E. 535] ; cf. Wells v. Gould, 131 Me. 192 [160 A. 30] ; 112 
A.L.R. 553.) But the conclusion that the release of the original 
wrongdoer releases the attending doctor from liability for 
malpractice has been reached by treating the independent 
wrongdoers as joint tort feasors or applying, by analogy, the 
common-law rule of unity of discharge affecting joint tort 
feasors. [4] The common-law rule of unity of discharge is 
based on the concept of the unity of a' cause of action against 
joint tort feasors, and its application to the facts of the present 
case would give the independent tort feasors herein an advan-
tage wholly inconsistent with the nature of their liability. 
Moreover, the rule contended for by defendants would stifle 
compromises, favored in the law, inasmuch as the injured 
person could not effect a settlement with the original wrong-
doer without surrendering his separate cause of action against 
one who, by his independent tortious act, aggravated the 
injury. 
[5] A release of a cause of action against a wrongdoer is 
not a release of a separate or distinct cause of action against 
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another independent wrongdoer. It follows that the mere re-
lease of Wubben from liability did not result in the discharge 
of the cause of action against defendants. [6] Weare of the 
opinion that a release of the original wrongdoer should re-
lease an attending doctor from liability for aggravation of 
the injury "if t:nere has been full compensation for both in-
juries, but not otherwise." (Prosser, Joint Torts and Several 
Liability, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413, 435; Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 
150 [106 A. 602] ; cf. Smith v. Coleman, 46 Cal.App.2d 507, 
513 [116 P 2d 133]; Wallner v. Barry, 207 Cal. 465, 473 
[279 P. 148].) 
[7] Defendants next contend that plaintiff has in fact re-
ceived full compensation for both injuries. They argue, in 
this respect, that Dr. W. L. Mortensen, appearing as a wit-
ness for plaintiff in her action against Wubben, gave testi-
mony concerning injuries which plaintiff now asserts resulted 
from their negligence and for which she seeks damages in 
this suit, and that the judgment against Wubben necessarily 
included an award for damages suffered by reason of mal-
practice. Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that 
in her action against Wubben plaintiff sought to recover all 
the elements of damages to which she may be entitled, the 
record does not support the contention that plaintiff has re-
ceived full compensation for both injuries. The only approxi-
mation of fair compensation for all the damages sustained by 
plaintiff which the record in this case offers is the sum of 
$15,000, the amount of the judgment against Wubben. Until 
plaintiff has received money in excess of that figure, there is 
nothing to show that she has been compensated twice for the 
same injury. It is undisputed that plaintiff received only 
*5,753.22, or slightly more than one-third of the amount of 
the judgment, and, in our opinion, she is entitled to recover 
from defendants for actual damages suffered by reason of 
their tortious acts, if any, for which she has received no com-
pensation. 
[8] It has been held in some cases involving unliquidated 
tort ,demands that the payment of any sum in consideration 
of the release of one of several joint or independent concur-
rent tort feasors will be presumed to have been made and ac-
cepted as full compensation or satisfaction for the alleged 
injury. (Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal.App. 701 [268 P. 943]; 
Flynn v. Manson, 19 Cal.App. 400 [126 P. 181] ; Dwy v. C.on-
660 ASH v. MORTENSEN (24 C .. 2d 
necticut Co., 89 Conn. 74 [92 A. 883, L.R.A. 1915E 800]; 
Masterson v. Berlin St. R. Co., 83 N.H. 190 [139 A. 753] ; see 
Dougherty v. CfLlifornia Kettleman Oil Royalties, Inc., 13 Cal. 
2d 174, 181 [88 P.2d 690] ; cf. Tompkins v. Clay St. R.R., 66 
Cal. 163 [4 P. 1165].) There is also authority to the contrary. 
(McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659.) But whatever may be 
the rule with regard to a settlement with joint or independent 
tort feasors whose acts concur to produce a single injury, it 
does not follow that such presumption should be indulged 
where, as here, the injured person's claim embraces separate 
injuries caused by independent successive tort feasors and is 
liquidated by a judgment against the original tort feasor. The 
presumption of full compeuaation or satisfaction found in the 
cited cases must be based on the fact that there is but a single 
indivisible injury and that the elaim arising therefrom is un-
liquidated. Under the circumstances of this case, it would be 
more logical to presume that part payment of the Wubben 
judgment represented merely the best obtainable compromise 
for the liability of the judgment debtor. (Cf. McKenna v. 
A.ustin, supra,p. 664.) 
[9] We do not wish to be understood as holding that in 
every case of this kind the question of double recovery is to 
be determined solely by referenee to the amount awarded in 
the first action. The jury's award in the action against Wub-
ben is not binding on defendants or res judicata as to them. 
They have the right to show what damage, if any, was actually 
suffered by reason of malpractice and to have the jury's award 
in this action restricted to the difference between such damage 
and any sum already received by plaintiff as compensation 
therefor. Defendants, however, successfully objected to an 
attempt by plaintiff to introduce evidence of the nature and 
e~tent of the separate injuries caused by the successive wrong-
doers. There was therefore no consideration of the actual 
facts, and the record is devoid of evidence from which double 
recovery could be inferred. 
The judgments are reversed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. When plaintiff's 
action against Wubben was tried, she was Still under the medi-
cal care of the defendants. On the trial of the aetion one of 
the defendants testilied with regard to the nature of the in-
Aug. 1944J ASH v. MOR'i"ElNsiN 
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jury suffered by plaintiff, the progress of her recuperation 
until the date of trial, and her prospects for recovery. He 
stated that plaintiff's right leg had improved enough so that 
she could put weight on it, but that the fracture of the left 
leg had not healed as well, because the ends of the bone were 
not end to end, and that it might be another month or two 
before there was a callous formation. Unless the hardening 
took place within that time it would be necessary to use sur-
gery to fasten the ends of the bone with a metal plate and 
screws. As to the probability of plaintiff's future ability to 
walk he said: "In any event, she probably will not be able 
to walk at all normally with these legs in less than a year's 
time, from the time of the accident. At that time she may he 
left with some impairment to her walking." Plaintiff contend.'! 
that the defendants were negligent, on the grounds that they 
failed to secure the bones in proper position before making 
the cast, and failed to reset the bones properly after discover-
ing the improper alignment through X-rays. She claims that 
as a result of this negligence she is not able to walk for more 
than short distance.'!. The $15,000 judgment, insofar as it 
took into account plaintiff's impaired physical condition, was 
based on the e~pert testimony of one of the defendants; there-
fore neither defendants' possible negligence nor its possible 
consequences beyond the complications of the healing process 
described in the testimony had any influence on the judgment. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff had 
any information as to the alleged malpractice when she en-
tered into the agreement with Wubben after the judgment. 
For the purposes of this appeal it must therefore be assumed 
that at the time of the trial of her action against Wubben 
and of her agreement with him, plaintiff was ignorant of any 
negligence of the defendants and acted on the advice received 
from the defendants as her physicians. 
If the improper alignment of the bones in the left leg was 
a consequence of defendants' negligence, it was also a con-
sequence of the accident which the jury could properly con-
/ sider in reaching its verdict, since defendants' testimony 
revealed plaintiff's aggravated condition. Other consequences 
of defendants' alleged negligence, however, such as the alleged 
failure to reset the bones properly, were not considered on 
the trial, and the $15,000 judgment therefore does not fully 
reflect tlie injury allegedly caused by negligence of the defen-
dants. 
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Any injury caused by malpractice of defendants that· was 
not disclosed by the expert testimony at the trial and that 
was therefore not reflected in the judgment can be recov-
ered in this action, although the judgment rendered in plain-
tiff's action against Wubben is res judicata insofar as it was 
based on the same facts as in the present action. (Bernhard 
v. Bank of America, 19 Ca1.2d 807, 812 [122 P.2d 892]; 
Good Health etc. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14 [9 N.E.2d 758, 
112 A.L.R. 401].) Defendants cannot rely on the former 
judgment as res judicata insofar as their own misrepresenta-
tions, though innocently made, led to plaintiff's failure to 
include her entire claim in the original action. (White v. 
Adler, 289 N.Y. 34 [43 N.E.2d 798, 142 A.L.R. 898]; Vine-
sock v. Great Northern R. Co., 136 Minn. 96 [161 N.W. 494, 
2 A.L.R. 530, 531]; Restatement: Judgments, §62(b) and 
Comment; see Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d 
636 [134 P.2d 242] ; 2 A.L.R. 534, 142 A.L.R. 905.) 
As to that part of the injury caused by defendants and 
included in plaintiff's action against Wubben, the judgment 
in that action cannot alone discharge defendants, but satis-
faction of that judgment would discharge them in the ab-
sence of duress, fraud, or mistake. The applicable rule is 
set forth in section 95 of the Restatement of J'udgments: 
"The discharge or satisfaction of a judgment ngainst one of 
several persons each of whom is liable for a tort, breach' of 
contract, or other breach of duty, discharges each of the oth-
ers from liability therefor." (See, also, Restatement: Torts, 
§886.) This rule applies when the original wrongdoer sat-
isfies a judgment that includes damages for aggravation of 
the injury because of the negligence of an independent tort-
feasor. (Restatement: Judgments, § 95, Comment c; see But-
ler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 614 [43 P.4, 386] ; Milks v: McIver, 
264 N.Y. 267 [190 N.E. 487] ; Phillips v. Wern<Zorff, 215 Iowa 
521 [243 N.W. 525] ; Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209 [192 A. 
107, 112 A.L.R. 550] ; 29 Columb.L.Rev. 630, 634; 18 Cornell 
L.Q. 257, 258; 41 Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 137.) 
Where a judgment against a defendant responsible for the 
entire harm is satisfied as a whole, the obligation of another 
obligor is extinguished, whether the judgment was discharged 
by payment of its full amount or by any other performimce 
received in satisfaction of the judgment. "The fact that 
plaintiff recovered only part of the damages to which he was 
entitled is immaterial" (2 ~'reeman on Judgments (1925), 
Aug. 1944) ASH v. MORTENsEN 
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§ 578, p. 1225; Blackman v. Simpson, 120 Mich. 377 [79 
N.W. 573, 58 L.R.A. 410] ; Westbrook v. Mize, 35 Kan. 299 
[10 P. 881]), if the injured person has received "what in law 
is deemed the equivalent" to actual satisfaction. (Urton v. 
Price, 57 Cal. 270, 272; see Dawson v. Schloss, 93 Cal. 194, 
199 [29 P. 31] ; Chetwood v. California Nat. Bank, 113 Cal. 
414 [45 P. 704] ; Tompkin v. Clay St. R. R., 66 Cal. 163 [4 P. 
1165]; Butler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 614 [43 P. 4, 386]; 
Grundel v. Union Iron Works, 127 Cal. 438, 442 [59 P. 826, 
78 Am.St.Rep. 75, 47 L.R.A. 467]; Black v. Bringhurst, 7 
Cal.App.2d 711 (46 P.2d 993] ; Minehan v. Silveria, 11 Cal. 
App.2d 266 [53 P.2d 770] ; 6 Cal.L.Rev. 230.) 
Plaintiff, according to the instrument she executed, received 
$5,753.22 "for the purpose of making a full and final com-
promise, adjustment and settlement of all claims for injuries, 
10000cs and damages resulting or to result from said accident" 
and discharged Wubben "from any and all actions, causes 
of actions, claims and demands of whatsoever kind or nature 
on account of any and all known and unknown injuries, losses 
and damages." It was therefore the obvious intention of the 
parties to have the payment of $5,753.22 extinguish the entire 
judgment, not merely a part of it. By thus discharging Wub-
ben's entire obligation, the parties did not intend to reserve 
plaintiff's rights against the other tort feasors for any dam-
ages covered by the judgment; nor could they have so in-
tended, for neither of them knew or suspected that plaintiff 
had any claim against defendants. If "facts and intentions 
control" (McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 664), the settle-
ment was made and accepted in full satisfaction of the judg-
ment. Plaintiff's right of action against defendants for any 
damages covered by the judgment would therefore be barred 
were, it not for the fact that the agreement between her and 
Wubben was made in ignorance of her claim against them. A 
general release purporting to cover all claims does not extend 
to claims that the creditor does not know or suspect exist in 
his favor at the time of executing the release, if knowledge 
of such claims would have materially affected his settlement 
with the debtor. (Civ. Code, § 1542; Backus v. Sessions, 17 
Cal.2d 380 [110 P.2d 51] ; O'Meara v. Haiden, 204 Cal. 354 
(268 P. 334, 60 A.L.R. 1381J; see 30 Cal.L.Rev. 111; 96 
A.L.R. 1144.) The provision in the release making it applicable 
to "upknown injuries, losses and damages" relates only to 
unknown claims against Wubben (see Berry v. Strubble, 20 
6M CITY OF WHITTiER v. nIXON [24 C.M 
Cai.App.2d 299 [66 P.2d 746]), but not to unknown claims 
against others. 
. Plaintiff il). the present action may therefore recover: (a) 
damages for that part of the injury that can be attributed 
to malpractice of the defendants, which, because of their rep-
resentations, innocent or otherwise, were not included in 
the judgment against Wubben; (b) that part of the dam-
ages included in the jUdgment against Wubben that can be 
attributed to malpractice of defendants, less such part, if any, 
of the $5,753.22 already received from Wubben as exceeds 
~.e amount of damages for which Wubben is alone responsible. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Septem-
ber 1, 1944. 
[L. A. No. 19005. In Bank. Aug. 11, 1944.] 
CITY OF WHITTIER et al., Petitioners, v. GUY N. DIXON, 
as City Clerk, etc., Respondent. 
[1] l'4a~ndamus-Duties Enfarceable.-Mandamus will lie to COnt-
pel the performance of a ministerial duty, such as the signing 
of a bond or wal'l'ant or the issuance of a warrant. 
[2]Statutes-Tltle-Su1ficiency of • ....:..The title of an act meets 
the requi,remenis of Const., art. IV, § 24, if it contains a rea-
:. sonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the legis-
lation is addressed. 
[SJ AutomobUes-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1945.-The 
title of the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, 
p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3) contains 
.. 0. reasonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the 
legislation is addressed. The levy and collection of assess-
ments mentioned in the title include reassessments, and the 
reference in the title to the acquisition and construction of 
parking places and other improvements for parking includes 
[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 804; 34 Am.Jur. 859. 
[21See 23 Cal.Jur. 650; 50 Am.Jur. 137. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 6; [2] Statutus, § 48; 
i[;i-7.J .A,)ltomnbiles, .. ~ 8. 
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the acquisition and improvement of lands, property and 
rights of way necessary or convenient for ingress to or 
egress from any parking place. 
[4] Id.-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1945.-The Vehicle 
Parking District Act of 1943 does not violate Const., art. 
XI, § 13, prohibiting the delegation of any municipal func-
tion to a special commission, where the parking place com-
missioners therein authorized to be appointed are city officers 
appointed by the legislative body of the city when it elects 
to acquire parking places under the act, and are removable 
at the pleasure of that body. 
[5] Id.-Parking Places.-Legislation authorizing the acquisition 
of parking places to serve the public is valid so long as it 
serves some public p'lrpose. Public parking places relieve 
congestion and reduce traffic hazards and therefore serve a 
public purpose. 
[6] Id.-Parking Places-Assessments.-Parking places that tend 
to stabilize a business section benefit the property in the 
vicinity so as to justify the levy of a special assessment in 
connection with the acquisition of such places. 
[7] Id.-Parking Places-Eminent Domain.-A city can condemn 
property for parking places under the Vehicle Parking Dis-
trict Act of 1943, although such authority is not granted by 
the eminent domain provisions of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, as the Vehicle Parking District Act is a general law 
and expressly authorizes the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain to acquire parking lots. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel a city clerk to 
countersign a warrant for payment of costs of pUblication of 
an ordinance of intention. Writ granted. 
Henry L. Knoop, City Attorney, 0 'Melveny & Myers and 
James L. Beebe for Petitioners. 
Clyde C. Woodworth for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By this proceeding in mandamus petition-
ers seek to compel respondent city clerk to countersign a war. 
rant for the payment of the costs of publication of an ordi-
nance of intention, in a proceeding for the formation of Ve-
hicle Parking District No. 1 of the City of WhIttier, under 
the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943. (Stats. 1943, ch. 
971, p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3.) Re-
spondent has refused to countersign the warrant contending 
, 
I,. ii 
